Veitmam+war

The **Vietnam War** [|[A 3]] was a [|Cold War] -era [|military conflict] that occurred in [|Vietnam], [|Laos] , and [|Cambodia] from 1 November 1955 [|[A 1]] to the [|fall of Saigon] on 30 April 1975. This war followed the [|First Indochina War] and was fought between [|North Vietnam], supported by its [|communist] allies, and the government of [|South Vietnam] , supported by the [|United States] and other [|anti-communist] countries. [|[25]] The [|Viet Cong] (also known as the National Liberation Front, or NLF), a lightly armed South Vietnamese communist-controlled [|common front], largely fought a [|guerrilla war] against anti-communist forces in the region. The [|Vietnam People's Army] (North Vietnamese Army) engaged in a more [|conventional war], at times committing large units into battle. U.S. and South Vietnamese forces relied on [|air superiority] and overwhelming firepower to conduct [|search and destroy] operations, involving [|ground forces], [|artillery] , and [|airstrikes]. The U.S. government viewed involvement in the war as a way to prevent a [|communist] takeover of South Vietnam as part of their wider strategy of [|containment]. The North Vietnamese government and Viet Cong viewed the conflict as a [|colonial war], fought initially against [|France] , backed by the U.S., and later against South Vietnam, which it regarded as a U.S. [|puppet state]. [|[26]] American [|military advisors] arrived in what was then [|French Indochina] beginning in 1950. U.S. involvement escalated in the early 1960s, with troop levels tripling in 1961 and tripling again in 1962. [|[27]] U.S. [|combat units] were deployed beginning in 1965. Operations spanned international borders, with Laos and Cambodia heavily bombed. American involvement in the war peaked in 1968, at the time of the [|Tet Offensive]. After this, U.S. ground forces were gradually withdrawn as part of a policy known as [|Vietnamization]. Despite the [|Paris Peace Accords], signed by all parties in January 1973, fighting continued. U.S. military involvement ended on 15 August 1973 as a result of the [|Case–Church Amendment] passed by the U.S. Congress. [|[28]] The [|capture of Saigon] by the Vietnam People's Army in April 1975 marked the end of the war, and North and South Vietnam were reunified the following year. The war exacted a huge human cost in terms of fatalities (see [|Vietnam War casualties] ). Estimates of the number of Vietnamese soldiers and civilians killed vary from less than one million [|[29]] to more than five million. [|[7]][|[30]] Some 200,000–300,000 [|Cambodians], [|[17]][|[18]][|[19]] 20,000–200,000 [|Laotians] , [|[31]][|[32]][|[33]][|[34]][|[35]][|[36]] and President Eisenhower noted that had the Geneva Accords been held, "possibly 80 percent of the population would have voted for Communist Ho Chi Minh" and the government quickly became more repressive and unpopular. The Diem government had largely failed in implementing a [|land reform] program for the peasants of South Vietnam (90% of the population) which along with "Peace, security, freedom, [and] their standard of living" was the peasants' prime concern according to specialist Philippe Devillers. Among the changes the government altered the tenant structure to competitive bidding which led to more tenant insecurity. Only 10% of the tenants benefited from the program and were oftentimes northerners, refugees, or Catholics which created more animosity among the Vietnamese. In 1959 the program became inoperative and by 1960, only 2% of the landowners owned 45% of the land. [|[24]] The South government used widespread repression, between 1954 and 1960 it captured 50,000 prisoners and had put them into "political reeducation camps" as part of the Denunciation of Communists Campaign. In 1959 British specialist [|PJ Honey] was invited to examine the camps and concluded after interviewing rural Vietnamese that "the consensus of the opinion expressed by these peoples is that...the majority of the detainees are neither communists nor pro-communists." [|[24]] According to the //Pentagon Papers// the prisons were "little more than concentration camps for potential foes of the government" and used torture regardless of whether they were communist or not. The Diem government had also abolished elections for village councils out of fear of large amounts of Viet Minh candidates winning and replaced administrative village autonomy with government officials. [|[24]] This had an effect, between 1954 and 1957 there was large scale random dissidence in the countryside which the Diem government managed to successfully quell. In early 1957 South Vietnam had its first peace in over a decade. However, by mid-1957 through 1959 incidents of violence increased but the government "did not construe it as a campaign, considering the disorders too diffuse to warrant committing major GVN resources." By Early 1959 however, Diem had considered it a campaign and implemented Law 10/59, which made political violence punishable by death and property confiscation. [|[103]] There had been some division among former Viet Minh whose main goal was to hold the elections promised in the Geneva Accords, leading to " [|wildcat] " activities separate from the other communists and anti-GVN activists. [|[24]] In December 1960, the [|National Liberation Front] (NLF) was formally created consisting of all anti-GVN activists and included non-communists. According to the //Pentagon Papers//, the NLF "placed heavy emphasis on the withdrawal of American advisors and influence, on land reform and liberalization of the GVN, on [|coalition government] and the neutralization of Vietnam." Often the leaders of the organization were kept secret. [|[24]]

North Vietnam interference?
Very little evidence points to organization or interference on the part of North Vietnam. As the //Pentagon Papers// point out, "No direct links have been established between Hanoi and perpetrators of rural violence." As Kahin and Lewis point out: > Contrary to United States policy assumptions, all available evidence shows that the revival of the civil war in the South in 1958 was undertaken by Southerners at their own—not Hanoi's—initiative...Insurgency activity against the Saigon government began in the South under Southern leadership not as a consequence of any dictate from Hanoi, but contrary to Hanoi's injunctions. [|[24]] Similarly, historian [|Arthur Schlesinger Jr.] states that "it was not until September, 1960 that the Communist Party of North Vietnam bestowed its formal blessing and called for the liberation of the south from American imperialism". [|[24]]

During John F. Kennedy's administration, 1961–1963
Main articles: [|Strategic Hamlet Program] and [|Pham Ngoc Thao] In the [|1960 U.S. presidential election], Senator [|John F. Kennedy] defeated Vice-President [|Richard Nixon]. Although Eisenhower warned Kennedy about Laos and Vietnam, Europe and Latin America "loomed larger than Asia on his sights." [|[104]] In his inaugural address, Kennedy made the ambitious pledge to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and success of liberty." [|[105]] In June 1961, he bitterly disagreed with Soviet premier [|Nikita Khrushchev] when they [|met in Vienna] to discuss key U.S.-Soviet issues. The Kennedy administration remained essentially committed to the Cold War foreign policy inherited from the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. In 1961, the U.S. had 50,000 troops based in Korea, and Kennedy faced a three-part crisis – the failure of the [|Bay of Pigs Invasion], the construction of the [|Berlin Wall] , and a negotiated settlement between the pro-Western government of Laos and the [|Pathet Lao] communist movement. [|[106]] These made Kennedy believe that another failure on the part of the United States to gain control and stop communist expansion would fatally damage U.S. credibility with its allies and his own reputation. Kennedy was thus determined to "draw a line in the sand" and prevent a communist victory in Vietnam. He told James Reston of // [|The New York Times] // immediately after his Vienna meeting with Khrushchev, "Now we have a problem making our power credible and Vietnam looks like the place." [|[107]] [|[108]] In May 1961, Vice President [|Lyndon B. Johnson] visited Saigon and enthusiastically declared Diem the " [|Winston Churchill] of Asia." [|[109]] Asked why he had made the comment, Johnson replied, "Diem's the only boy we got out there." [|[102]] Johnson assured Diem of more aid in molding a fighting force that could resist the communists. Kennedy's policy toward South Vietnam rested on the assumption that Diem and his forces must ultimately defeat the guerrillas on their own. He was against the deployment of American combat troops and observed that "to introduce U.S. forces in large numbers there today, while it might have an initially favorable military impact, would almost certainly lead to adverse political and, in the long run, adverse military consequences." [|[110]] The quality of the South Vietnamese military, however, remained poor. Bad leadership, corruption, and political promotions all played a part in emasculating the ARVN. The frequency of guerrilla attacks rose as the insurgency gathered steam. While Hanoi's support for the NLF played a role, South Vietnamese governmental incompetence was at the core of the crisis. [|[111]] [|South Vietnam], Military Regions, 1967 One major issue Kennedy raised was whether the Soviet space and missile programs had surpassed those of the United States. Although Kennedy stressed long-range missile parity with the Soviets, he was also interested in using special forces for counterinsurgency warfare in Third World countries threatened by communist insurgencies. Although they were originally intended for use behind front lines after a conventional invasion of Europe, Kennedy believed that the guerrilla tactics employed by special forces such as the [|Green Berets] would be effective in a "brush fire" war in Vietnam. Kennedy advisers [|Maxwell Taylor] and [|Walt Rostow] recommended that U.S. troops be sent to South Vietnam disguised as flood relief workers. Kennedy rejected the idea but increased military assistance yet again. In April 1962, [|John Kenneth Galbraith] warned Kennedy of the "danger we shall replace the French as a colonial force in the area and bleed as the French did." [|[112]] By 1963, there were 16,000 American military personnel in South Vietnam, up from Eisenhower's 900 advisors. [|[113]] The [|Strategic Hamlet Program] had been initiated in 1961. This joint U.S.-South Vietnamese program attempted to resettle the rural population into fortified camps. The aim was to isolate the population from the insurgents, provide education and health care, and strengthen the government's hold over the countryside.[// [|citation needed] //] The Strategic Hamlets, however, were quickly infiltrated by the guerrillas.[// [|citation needed] //] The peasants resented being uprooted from their ancestral villages.[// [|citation needed] //] In part, this was because Colonel [|Pham Ngoc Thao], a Diem favourite who was instrumental in running the program, was in fact a communist agent who used his Catholicism to gain influential posts and damage the ROV from the inside.[// [|citation needed] //] The government refused to undertake land reform, which left farmers paying high rents to a few wealthy landlords. Corruption dogged the program and intensified opposition. On 23 July 1962, fourteen nations, including the People's Republic of China, South Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam and the United States, signed an agreement promising the neutrality of Laos. [|[114]]

Coup and assassinations
//See also: [|Kennedy's role], [|1960 South Vietnamese coup attempt] , [|1962 South Vietnamese Independence Palace bombing] , [|Huế Phật Đản shootings] and [|Xa Loi Pagoda raids] // Main articles: [|Cable 243], [|Arrest and assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem] , [|Buddhist crisis] , [|Krulak Mendenhall mission] , [|McNamara Taylor mission] , [|1963 South Vietnamese coup] , and [|Reaction to the 1963 South Vietnamese coup] The inept performance of the South Vietnamese army was exemplified by failed actions such as the [|Battle of Ap Bac] on 2 January 1963, in which a small band of Viet Cong beat off a much larger and better equipped South Vietnamese force, many of whose officers seemed reluctant even to engage in combat. [|[115]] The ARVN were led in that battle by Diem's most trusted general, [|Huynh Van Cao], commander of the [|IV Corps]. Cao was a Catholic who had been promoted due to religion and fidelity rather than skill, and his main job was to preserve his forces to stave off coups; he had earlier vomited during a communist attack. Some policymakers in Washington began to conclude that Diem was incapable of defeating the communists and might even make a deal with Ho Chi Minh. He seemed concerned only with fending off coups, and had become more paranoid after attempts in 1960 and 1962, which he partly attributed to U.S. encouragement. As [|Robert F. Kennedy] noted, "Diem wouldn't make even the slightest concessions. He was difficult to reason with..." [|[116]] Discontent with Diem's policies exploded following the [|Huế Phật Đản shootings] of majority Buddhists who were protesting against the ban on the [|Buddhist flag] on [|Vesak], the Buddha's birthday. This resulted in mass protests against discriminatory policies that gave privileges to the Catholic Church and its adherents. Diem's elder brother [|Ngo Dinh Thuc] was the Archbishop of Huế and aggressively blurred the separation between church and state. Thuc's anniversary celebrations shortly before Vesak had been bankrolled by the government and Vatican flags were displayed prominently. There had also been reports of Buddhist pagodas being demolished by Catholic paramilitaries throughout Diem's rule. Diem refused to make concessions to the Buddhist majority or take responsibility for the deaths. On 21 August 1963, the [|ARVN Special Forces] of Colonel [|Le Quang Tung], loyal to Diem's younger brother [|Ngo Dinh Nhu] , [|raided pagodas across Vietnam] , causing widespread damage and destruction and leaving a death toll estimated to range into the hundreds. [|Ngo Dinh Diem] after being shot and killed in the 1963 coup. U.S. officials began discussing the possibility of a regime change during the middle of 1963. The [|United States Department of State] was generally in favor of encouraging a coup, while the Defense Department favored Diem. Chief among the proposed changes was the removal of Diem's younger brother Nhu, who controlled the secret police and special forces was seen as the man behind the Buddhist repression and more generally the architect of the Ngo family's rule. This proposal was conveyed to the U.S. embassy in Saigon in [|Cable 243]. The [|Central Intelligence Agency] (CIA) was in contact with generals planning to remove Diem. They were told that the United States would not oppose such a move nor punish the generals by cutting off aid. President Diem was overthrown and executed, along with his brother, on 2 November 1963. When he was informed, Maxwell Taylor remembered that Kennedy "rushed from the room with a look of shock and dismay on his face." [|[117]] He had not approved Diem's murder. The U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, [|Henry Cabot Lodge], invited the coup leaders to the embassy and congratulated them. Ambassador Lodge informed Kennedy that "the prospects now are for a shorter war". [|[118]] Following the coup, chaos ensued. Hanoi took advantage of the situation and increased its support for the guerrillas. South Vietnam entered a period of extreme political instability, as one military government toppled another in quick succession. Increasingly, each new regime was viewed as a puppet of the Americans; whatever the failings of Diem, his credentials as a nationalist (as Robert McNamara later reflected) had been impeccable. [|[119]] U.S military advisers were embedded at every level of the South Vietnamese armed forces. They were, however, almost completely ignorant of the political nature of the [|insurgency]. The insurgency was a political power struggle, in which military engagements were not the main goal. [|[120]] The Kennedy administration sought to refocus U.S. efforts on pacification and "winning over the hearts and minds" of the population. The military leadership in Washington, however, was hostile to any role for U.S. advisers other than conventional troop training. [|[121]] General [|Paul Harkins], the commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, confidently predicted victory by Christmas 1963. [|[122]] The CIA was less optimistic, however, warning that "the Viet Cong by and large retain de facto control of much of the countryside and have steadily increased the overall intensity of the effort". [|[123]] Paramilitary officers from the CIA's [|Special Activities Division] trained and led Hmong tribesmen in Laos and into Vietnam. The indigenous forces numbered in the tens of thousands and they conducted direct action missions, led by paramilitary officers, against the Communist Pathet Lao forces and their North Vietnamese supporters. [|[124]] The CIA also ran the [|Phoenix Program] and participation [|Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group] (MAC-V SOG), which was originally named the Special Operations Group, but was changed for cover purposes. [|[125]]

Lyndon B. Johnson escalates the war, 1963–1969
A U.S. [|B-66 Destroyer] and four [|F-105 Thunderchiefs] dropping bombs on [|North Vietnam] Main article: [|Joint warfare in South Vietnam 1963–1969] Further information: [|Role of United States in the Vietnam War: Americanization] See also: [|Opposition to the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War], [|Gulf of Tonkin incident] , [|1964 South Vietnamese coup] , [|September 1964 South Vietnamese coup attempt] , [|December 1964 South Vietnamese coup] , and [|1965 South Vietnamese coup] [|Lyndon B. Johnson] (LBJ), as he took over the presidency after the [|death of Kennedy], initially did not consider Vietnam a priority and was more concerned with his " [|Great Society] " and progressive social programs. Presidential aide [|Jack Valenti] recalls, "Vietnam at the time was no bigger than a man's fist on the horizon. We hardly discussed it because it was not worth discussing." [|[126]] [|[127]] On 24 November 1963, Johnson said, "the battle against communism... must be joined... with strength and determination." [|[128]] The pledge came at a time when Vietnam was deteriorating, especially in places like the Mekong Delta, because of the recent coup against Diem. [|[129]] Johnson had reversed Kennedy's disengagement policy from Vietnam in withdrawing 1,000 troops by the end of 1963 ( [|NSAM] 263 on 11 October), [|[130]] with his own NSAM 273 (26 November) [|[131]] [|[132]] to expand the war. The military revolutionary council, meeting in lieu of a strong South Vietnamese leader, was made up of 12 members headed by General [|Duong Van Minh] —whom [|Stanley Karnow], a journalist on the ground, later recalled as "a model of lethargy." [|[133]] Lodge, frustrated by the end of the year, cabled home about Minh: "Will he be strong enough to get on top of things?" His regime was overthrown in January 1964 by General [|Nguyen Khanh]. [|[134]] However, there was persistent instability in the military as several coups—not all successful—occurred in a short space of time. An alleged NLF activist, captured during an attack on an American outpost near the Cambodian border, is interrogated. On 2 August 1964, the [|USS //Maddox//], on an intelligence mission along North Vietnam's coast, allegedly fired upon and damaged several torpedo boats that had been stalking it in the [|Gulf of Tonkin]. [|[135]] A second attack was reported two days later on the [|USS //Turner Joy//] and //Maddox// in the same area. The circumstances of the attack were murky. Lyndon Johnson commented to Undersecretary of State George Ball that "those sailors out there may have been shooting at flying fish." [|[136]] The second attack led to retaliatory air strikes, prompted Congress to approve the [|Gulf of Tonkin Resolution] on 5 August 1964, signed by Johnson, and gave the President power to conduct military operations in Southeast Asia without declaring war. [|[137]] Although Congressmen at the time denied that this was a full scale war declaration, the Tonkin Resolution allowed the President unilateral power to launch a full scale war if the President deemed necessary. [|[137]] In the same month, Johnson pledged that he was not "... committing American boys to fighting a war that I think ought to be fought by the boys of Asia to help protect their own land." [|[138]] An undated [|NSA] publication declassified in 2005, however, revealed that there was no attack on 4 August. [|[139]] It had already been called into question long before this. " [|Gulf of Tonkin incident] ", writes Louise Gerdes, "is an oft-cited example of the way in which Johnson misled the American people to gain support for his foreign policy in Vietnam." [|[140]] George C. Herring argues, however, that McNamara and the Pentagon "did not knowingly lie about the alleged attacks, but they were obviously in a mood to retaliate and they seem to have selected from the evidence available to them those parts that confirmed what they wanted to believe." [|[141]] "From a strength of approximately 5,000 at the start of 1959 the Viet Cong's ranks grew to about 100,000 at the end of 1964...Between 1961 and 1964 the Army's strength rose from about 850,000 to nearly a million men." [|[120]] The numbers for U.S. troops deployed to Vietnam during the same period were quite different; 2,000 in 1961, rising rapidly to 16,500 in 1964. [|[142]] A Marine from 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, moves an alleged NLF activist to the rear during a search and clear operation held by the battalion 15 miles (24 km) west of [|Da Nang Air Base]. The [|National Security Council] recommended a three-stage escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam. On 2 March 1965, following an attack on a [|U.S. Marine] barracks at [|Pleiku], [|[143]] [|Operation Flaming Dart] (initiated when Soviet Premier [|Alexei Kosygin] was at a [|state visit] to [|North Vietnam] ), [|Operation Rolling Thunder] and [|Operation Arc Light] commenced. [|[144]] The bombing campaign, which ultimately lasted three years, was intended to force North Vietnam to cease its support for the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) by threatening to destroy North Vietnam's air defenses and industrial infrastructure. As well, it was aimed at bolstering the morale of the South Vietnamese. [|[145]] Between March 1965 and November 1968, "Rolling Thunder" deluged the north with a million tons of missiles, rockets and bombs. [|[146]] Bombing was not restricted to North Vietnam. Other aerial campaigns, such as [|Operation Commando Hunt], targeted different parts of the NLF and VPA infrastructure. These included the [|Ho Chi Minh trail], which ran through Laos and Cambodia. The objective of forcing North Vietnam to stop its support for the NLF, however, was never reached. As one officer noted "this is a political war and it calls for discriminate killing. The best weapon... would be a knife... The worst is an airplane." [|[147]] The [|Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force] [|Curtis LeMay], however, had long advocated saturation bombing in Vietnam and wrote of the Communists that "we're going to bomb them back into the Stone Age". [|[148]]

Escalation and ground war
[|Universal Newsreel] film about an attack on U.S. air bases and the U.S. response. 1965         Peasants suspected of being Vietcong under detention of U.S. army, 1966 After several attacks upon them, it was decided that [|U.S. Air Force] bases needed more protection. The South Vietnamese military seemed incapable of providing security. On 8 March 1965, 3,500 [|U.S. Marines] were dispatched to South Vietnam. This marked the beginning of the American ground war. U.S. public opinion overwhelmingly supported the deployment. [|[149]] In a statement similar to that made to the French almost two decades earlier, Ho Chi Minh warned that if the Americans "want to make war for twenty years then we shall make war for twenty years. If they want to make peace, we shall make peace and invite them to afternoon tea." [|[150]] As former First Deputy Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co has noted, the primary goal of the war was to reunify Vietnam and secure its independence. The policy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was not to topple other non-communist governments in South East Asia. [|[151]] The Marines' assignment was defensive. The initial deployment of 3,500 in March was increased to nearly 200,000 by December. [|[152]] The U.S. military had long been schooled in offensive warfare. Regardless of political policies, U.S. commanders were institutionally and psychologically unsuited to a defensive mission. [|[152]] In December, ARVN forces suffered heavy losses at the [|Battle of Bình Giã], [|[153]] in a battle that both sides viewed as a watershed. Previously communist forces had utilized hit-and-run guerrilla tactics, however at Binh Gia they had defeated a strong ARVN force in conventional warfare. [|[154]] Tellingly, South Vietnamese forces were again defeated in June, at the [|Battle of Đồng Xoài]. [|[155]] U.S. soldiers searching a village for [|NLF] Desertion rates were increasing, and [|morale] plummeted. General [|William Westmoreland] informed Admiral [|U.S. Grant Sharp, Jr.], commander of U.S. Pacific forces, that the situation was critical. [|[152]] He said, "I am convinced that U.S. troops with their energy, mobility, and firepower can successfully take the fight to the NLF [National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam]." [|[156]] With this recommendation, Westmoreland was advocating an aggressive departure from America's defensive posture and the sidelining of the South Vietnamese. By ignoring ARVN units, the U.S. commitment became open-ended. [|[157]] Westmoreland outlined a three-point plan to win the war: The plan was approved by Johnson and marked a profound departure from the previous administration's insistence that the government of South Vietnam was responsible for defeating the guerrillas. Westmoreland predicted victory by the end of 1967. [|[159]] Johnson did not, however, communicate this change in strategy to the media. Instead he emphasized continuity. [|[160]] The change in U.S. policy depended on matching the North Vietnamese and the NLF in a contest of [|attrition] and [|morale]. The opponents were locked in a cycle of [|escalation]. [|[161]] The idea that the government of South Vietnam could manage its own affairs was shelved. [|[161]] Soviet Premier [|Alexei Kosygin] with U.S. President [|Lyndon B. Johnson] at the [|Glassboro Summit Conference] where the two representatives discussed the possibilities of a peace settlement. The one-year [|tour of duty] deprived units of experienced leadership. As one observer noted "we were not in Vietnam for 10 years, but for one year 10 times." [|[147]] As a result, training programs were shortened. South Vietnam was inundated with manufactured goods. As Stanley Karnow writes, "the main PX [Post Exchange], located in the Saigon suburb of [|Cholon], was only slightly smaller than the New York [|Bloomingdale's] ..." [|[162]] The American buildup transformed the economy and had a profound effect on South Vietnamese society. A huge surge in corruption was witnessed. The Ho Chi Minh Trail running through Laos, 1967 Washington encouraged its [|SEATO] allies to contribute troops. Australia, New Zealand, the [|Republic of Korea], [|Thailand] , and the [|Philippines] [|[163]] all agreed to send troops. Major allies, however, notably [|NATO] nations Canada and the United Kingdom, declined Washington's troop requests. [|[164]] The U.S. and its allies mounted complex operations, such as operations [|Masher], [|Attleboro] , [|Cedar Falls] , and [|Junction City]. However, the communist insurgents remained elusive and demonstrated great [|tactical] flexibility. Meanwhile, the political situation in South Vietnam began to stabilize with the coming to power of Prime Minister Air Marshal [|Nguyễn Cao Kỳ] and figurehead Chief of State, General [|Nguyễn Văn Thiệu], in mid 1965 at the head of a military junta. This ended a series of coups that had happened more than once a year. In 1967, Thieu became president with Ky as his deputy, after rigged elections. Although they were nominally a civilian government, Ky was supposed to maintain real power through a behind-the-scenes military body. However, Thieu outmanoevred and sidelined Ky by filling the ranks with generals from his faction. Thieu was also accused of murdering Ky loyalists through contrived military accidents. Thieu, mistrustful and indecisive, remained president until 1975, having won a one-man election in 1971. [|[165]] The Johnson administration employed a "policy of minimum candor" [|[166]] in its dealings with the media. Military information officers sought to manage media coverage by emphasizing stories that portrayed progress in the war. Over time, this policy damaged the public trust in official pronouncements. As the media's coverage of the war and that of the Pentagon diverged, a so-called [|credibility gap] developed. [|[166]]
 * Phase 1. Commitment of U.S. (and other free world) forces necessary to halt the losing trend by the end of 1965.
 * Phase 2. U.S. and allied forces mount major offensive actions to seize the initiative to destroy guerrilla and organized enemy forces. This phase would end when the enemy had been worn down, thrown on the defensive, and driven back from major populated areas.
 * Phase 3. If the enemy persisted, a period of twelve to eighteen months following Phase 2 would be required for the final destruction of enemy forces remaining in remote base areas. [|[158]]

Tet Offensive
Main article: [|Tet Offensive] Having lured General Westmoreland's forces into the hinterland at [|Khe Sanh] in [|Quảng Trị Province], [|[167]] in January 1968, the NVA and NLF broke the truce that had traditionally accompanied the [|Tết] (Lunar New Year) holiday. They launched the surprise Tet Offensive in the hope of sparking a national uprising. Over 100 cities were attacked, with assaults on General Westmoreland's headquarters and the [|U.S. Embassy, Saigon]. Although the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces were initially taken aback by the scale of the urban offensive, they responded quickly and effectively, decimating the ranks of the NLF. In the former capital city of [|Huế], the combined NLF and VPA troops captured the Imperial Citadel and much of the city, which led to the [|Battle of Huế]. Throughout the offensive, the American forces employed massive firepower; in Huế where the battle was the fiercest, that firepower left 80% of the city in ruins. [|[168]] During the interim between the capture of the Citadel and end of the "Battle of Huế", the communist insurgent occupying forces [|massacred several thousand unarmed Huế] civilians (estimates vary up to a high of 6,000). After the war, North Vietnamese officials acknowledged that the Tet Offensive had, indeed, caused grave damage to NLF forces. But the offensive had another, unintended consequence. General Westmoreland had become the public face of the war. He was featured on the cover of //Time// magazine three times and was named 1965's Man of the Year. [|[169]] //Time// described him as "the sinewy personification of the American fighting man... (who) directed the historic buildup, drew up the battle plans, and infused the... men under him with his own idealistic view of U.S. aims and responsibilities." [|[169]] U.S. Marines fighting in [|Huế] In November 1967 Westmoreland spearheaded a public relations drive for the Johnson administration to bolster flagging public support. [|[170]] In a speech before the [|National Press Club] he said that a point in the war had been reached "where the end comes into view." [|[171]] Thus, the public was shocked and confused when Westmoreland's predictions were trumped by Tet. [|[170]] The American media, which had been largely supportive of U.S. efforts, rounded on the Johnson administration for what had become an increasing credibility gap. Despite its military failure, the Tet Offensive became a political victory and ended the career of President Lyndon B. Johnson, who declined to run for re-election. Johnson's approval rating slumped from 48 to 36 percent. [|[170]] As James Witz noted, Tet "contradicted the claims of progress... made by the Johnson administration and the military." [|[170]] The Tet Offensive was the turning point in America's involvement in the Vietnam War. It had a profound impact on domestic support for the conflict. The offensive constituted an [|intelligence failure] on the scale of [|Pearl Harbor]. [|[163]] [|[172]] Journalist [|Peter Arnett] quoted an unnamed officer, saying of [|Bến Tre] (laid to rubble by U.S. firepower) [|[173]] that "it became necessary to destroy the village in order to save it" (though the authenticity of this quote is disputed). [|[174]] According to one source, this quote was attributed to Major Booris of 9th Infantry Division. [|[175]] NLF/NVA killed by U.S. air force personnel during an attack on the perimeter of Tan Son Nhut Air Base during the Tet Offensive Westmoreland became Chief of Staff of the Army in March, just as all resistance was finally subdued. The move was technically a promotion. However, his position had become untenable because of the offensive and because his request for 200,000 additional troops had been leaked to the media. Westmoreland was succeeded by his deputy [|Creighton Abrams], a commander less inclined to public media pronouncements. [|[176]] On 10 May 1968, despite low expectations, [|peace talks] began between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Negotiations stagnated for five months, until Johnson gave orders to halt the bombing of North Vietnam. The [|Democratic] candidate, Vice President [|Hubert Humphrey], was running against [|Republican] former vice president [|Richard Nixon]. As historian Robert Dallek writes, "Lyndon Johnson's escalation of the war in Vietnam divided Americans into warring camps... cost 30,000 American lives by the time he left office, (and) destroyed Johnson's presidency..." [|[177]] His refusal to send more U.S. troops to Vietnam was seen as Johnson's admission that the war was lost. [|[178]] It can be seen that the refusal was a tacit admission that the war could not be won by escalation, at least not at a cost acceptable to the American people. [|[178]] As Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara noted, "the dangerous illusion of victory by the United States was therefore dead." [|[179]]

Nixon Doctrine / Vietnamization
Propaganda leaflet urging the defection of NLF and North Vietnamese to the side of the Republic of Vietnam For more details on this topic, see [|Role of the United States in the Vietnam War#Vietnamization,_1969–1975] and [|#Vietnamization, 1969–1974]. Severe communist losses during the Tet Offensive allowed U.S. President [|Richard Nixon] to begin troop withdrawals. His plan, called the [|Nixon Doctrine], was to build up the ARVN, so that they could take over the defense of South Vietnam. The policy became known as " [|Vietnamization] ". Vietnamization had much in common with the policies of the Kennedy administration. One important difference, however, remained. While Kennedy insisted that the South Vietnamese fight the war themselves, he attempted to limit the scope of the conflict. Nixon said in an announcement, "I am tonight announcing plans for the withdrawal of an additional 150,000 American troops to be completed during the spring of next year. This will bring a total reduction of 265,500 men in our armed forces in Vietnam below the level that existed when we took office 15 months ago." [|[180]] On 10 October 1969, Nixon ordered a squadron of 18 [|B-52s] loaded with nuclear weapons [|to race to the border of Soviet airspace] to convince the Soviet Union that he was capable of anything to end the Vietnam War. Nixon also pursued negotiations. Theater commander [|Creighton Abrams] shifted to smaller operations, aimed at communist logistics, with better use of firepower and more cooperation with the ARVN. Nixon also began to pursue [|détente] with the Soviet Union and [|rapprochement with the People's Republic of China]. This policy helped to decrease global tensions. Détente led to nuclear arms reduction on the part of both [|superpowers]. But Nixon was disappointed that the PRC and the Soviet Union continued to supply the North Vietnamese with aid. In September 1969, Ho Chi Minh died at age seventy-nine. [|[181]] The anti-war movement was gaining strength in the United States. Nixon appealed to the " [|silent majority] " of Americans to support the war. But revelations of the [|My Lai Massacre], in which a U.S. Army [|platoon] raped and killed civilians, and the 1969 " [|Green Beret Affair] " where eight Special Forces soldiers, including the 5th Special Forces Group Commander were arrested for the murder [|[182]] of a suspected double agent [|[183]] provoked national and international outrage. Beginning in 1970, American troops were being taken away from border areas where much more killing took place, and instead put along the coast and interior, which is one reason why casualties in 1970 were less than half of 1969's totals. [|[180]]

The secret bombing of Cambodia and Laos
Main article: [|Operation Menu] Prince [|Norodom Sihanouk] had proclaimed Cambodia neutral since 1955, [|[184]] but the communists used Cambodian soil as a base and Sihanouk tolerated their presence, because he wished to avoid being drawn into a wider regional conflict. Under pressure from Washington, however, he changed this policy in 1969. The Vietnamese communists were no longer welcome. President Nixon took the opportunity to launch a massive secret bombing campaign, called Operation Menu, against their sanctuaries along the Cambodia/Vietnam border. This violated a long succession of pronouncements from Washington supporting Cambodian neutrality. Richard Nixon wrote to Prince Sihanouk in April 1969 assuring him that the United States respected "the sovereignty, neutrality and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia..." [|[185]] In 1970, Prince [|Sihanouk was deposed] by his pro-American prime minister [|Lon Nol]. The country's borders were closed, while U.S. forces and ARVN launched [|incursions into Cambodia] to attack VPA/NLF bases and buy time for South Vietnam. The invasion of Cambodia sparked [|nationwide U.S. protests]. [|Four students were killed by National Guardsmen] at [|Kent State University] during a protest in [|Ohio], which provoked public outrage in the United States. The reaction to the incident by the Nixon administration was seen as callous and indifferent, providing additional impetus for the anti-war movement. [|[186]] In 1971 the [|Pentagon Papers] were leaked to // [|The New York Times] //. The top-secret history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, commissioned by the Department of Defense, detailed a long series of public deceptions. The [|Supreme Court] ruled that its publication was legal. [|[187]] The ARVN launched [|Operation Lam Son 719] in February 1971, aimed at cutting the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos. [|[114]] The ostensibly neutral Laos had long been the scene of a secret war. After meeting resistance, ARVN forces retreated in a confused rout. They fled along roads littered with their own dead. When they ran out of fuel, soldiers abandoned their vehicles and attempted to barge their way on to American helicopters sent to evacuate the wounded. Many ARVN soldiers clung to helicopter skids in a desperate attempt to save themselves. U.S. aircraft had to destroy abandoned equipment, including tanks, to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. Half of the invading ARVN troops were either captured or killed. The operation was a fiasco and represented a clear failure of Vietnamization. As Karnow noted "the blunders were monumental... The (South Vietnamese) government's top officers had been tutored by the Americans for ten or fifteen years, many at training schools in the United States, yet they had learned little." [|[188]] In 1971 Australia and New Zealand withdrew their soldiers. The U.S. troop count was further reduced to 196,700, with a deadline to remove another 45,000 troops by February 1972. As [|peace protests] spread across the United States, disillusionment and ill-discipline grew in the ranks. [|[189]] Vietnamization was again tested by the [|Easter Offensive] of 1972, a massive conventional invasion of South Vietnam. The VPA and NLF quickly overran the northern provinces and in coordination with other forces attacked from Cambodia, threatening to cut the country in half. U.S. troop withdrawals continued. But American airpower came to the rescue with [|Operation Linebacker], and the offensive was halted. However, it became clear that without American airpower South Vietnam could not survive. The last remaining American ground troops were withdrawn in August.

1972 election and Paris Peace Accords
The war was the central issue of the [|1972 presidential election]. Nixon's opponent, [|George McGovern], campaigned on a platform of withdrawal from Vietnam. Nixon's National Security Adviser, [|Henry Kissinger], continued secret negotiations with North Vietnam's [|Lê Ðức Thọ]. In October 1972, they reached an agreement. However, South Vietnamese President Thieu demanded massive changes to the peace accord. When North Vietnam went public with the agreement's details, the Nixon administration claimed that the North was attempting to embarrass the President. The negotiations became deadlocked. Hanoi demanded new changes. [|Operation Linebacker II], December 1972 To show his support for South Vietnam and force Hanoi back to the negotiating table, Nixon ordered [|Operation Linebacker II], a massive bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong 18–29 December 1972. The offensive destroyed much of the remaining economic and industrial capacity of North Vietnam. Simultaneously Nixon pressured Thieu to accept the terms of the agreement, threatening to conclude a bilateral peace deal and cut off American aid. On 15 January 1973, Nixon announced the suspension of offensive action against North Vietnam. The [|Paris Peace Accords] on "Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam" were signed on 27 January 1973, officially ending direct U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. A cease-fire was declared across North and South Vietnam. U.S. [|POWs] were released. The agreement guaranteed the territorial integrity of Vietnam and, like the [|Geneva Conference] of 1954, called for national elections in the North and South. The Paris Peace Accords stipulated a sixty-day period for the total withdrawal of U.S. forces. "This article", noted Peter Church, "proved... to be the only one of the Paris Agreements which was fully carried out." [|[190]]

Opposition to the Vietnam War: 1962–1975
[|Protests against the war] in Washington DC on 24 April 1971         Victims of the [|My Lai Massacre] Main article: [|Opposition to the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War] Some advocates within the peace movement advocated a unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. One reason given for the withdrawal is that it would contribute to a lessening of tensions in the region and thus less human bloodshed. Early opposition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam was centered around the [|Geneva conference of 1954]. American support of Diem in refusing elections was thought to be thwarting the very democracy that America claimed to be supporting. John Kennedy, while Senator, opposed involvement in Vietnam. [|[142]] Opposition to the Vietnam War tended to unite groups opposed to U.S. anti-communism, [|imperialism] and [|colonialism] and, for those involved with the [|New Left] such as the [|Catholic Worker Movement], capitalism itself. Others, such as [|Stephen Spiro] opposed the war based on the theory of [|Just War]. Some wanted to show solidarity with the people of Vietnam, such as [|Norman Morrison] emulating the actions of [|Thích Quảng Đức]. Some critics of U.S. withdrawal predicted that it would not contribute to peace but rather vastly increase bloodshed. These critics advocated U.S. forces remain until all threats from the [|Viet Cong] and North Vietnamese Army had been eliminated. Advocates of U.S. withdrawal were generally known as "doves", and they called their opponents " [|hawks] ", following nomenclature dating back to the [|War of 1812]. High-profile opposition to the Vietnam War turned to street protests in an effort to turn U.S. political opinion. On 15 October 1969, the [|Vietnam Moratorium] attracted millions of Americans. [|[191]] The [|fatal shooting] of four students at [|Kent State University] led to nation-wide university protests. [|[192]] Riots broke out at the [|1968 Democratic National Convention]. [|[193]] After explosive news reports of American [|military abuses], such as the 1968 [|My Lai Massacre] , brought new attention and support to the anti-war movement, some veterans joined [|Vietnam Veterans Against the War]. Anti-war protests ended with the final withdrawal of troops after the [|Paris Peace Accords] were signed in 1973. South Vietnam was left to defend itself alone when the fighting resumed. Many South Vietnamese subsequently fled to the United States. [|[194]]
 * = [[image:http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/bd/Ambox_globe_content.svg/48px-Ambox_globe_content.svg.png width="48" height="40" caption="Globe icon."]] || The examples and perspective in this article **may not represent a [|worldwide view] of the subject**. Please [|improve this article] and discuss the issue on the [|talk page] . //(April 2010)// ||

Exit of the Americans: 1973–1975
The United States began drastically reducing their troop support in South Vietnam during the final years of " [|Vietnamization] ". Many U.S. troops were removed from the region, and on 5 March 1971, the United States returned the [|5th Special Forces Group], which was the first American unit deployed to [|South Vietnam] , to its former base in [|Fort Bragg] , [|North Carolina]. [|[195]] [|[A 5]] Under the [|Paris Peace Accords], between North Vietnamese Foreign Minister [|Lê Ðức Thọ] and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and reluctantly signed by South Vietnamese President [|Thiệu] , U.S. military forces withdrew from South Vietnam and prisoners were exchanged. North Vietnam was allowed to continue supplying communist troops in the South, but only to the extent of replacing materials that were consumed. Later that year the [|Nobel Peace Prize] was awarded to Kissinger and Thọ, but the Vietnamese negotiator declined it saying that a true peace did not yet exist. The communist leaders had expected that the ceasefire terms would favor their side. But Saigon, bolstered by a surge of U.S. aid received just before the ceasefire went into effect, began to roll back the Vietcong. The communists responded with a new strategy hammered out in a series of meetings in Hanoi in March 1973, according to the memoirs of [|Trần Văn Trà]. [|[198]] As the Vietcong's top commander, Trà participated in several of these meetings. With U.S. bombings suspended, work on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and other logistical structures could proceed unimpeded. Logistics would be upgraded until the North was in a position to launch a massive invasion of the South, projected for the 1975–76 dry season. Trà calculated that this date would be Hanoi's last opportunity to strike before Saigon's army could be fully trained. [|[198]] Calling for immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam, George McGovern's 1972 Presidential Campaign lost 49 of 50 states to Richard Nixon. In the November 1972 Election, McGovern lost 49 of 50 states to Richard Nixon, who was re-elected U.S. president. Despite supporting Nixon over McGovern, many American voters [|split their tickets], returning a Democratic majority to both houses of Congress. On 15 March 1973, U.S. President [|Richard Nixon] implied that the United States would intervene militarily if the communist side violated the ceasefire. Public and congressional reaction to Nixon's trial balloon was unfavorable and in April Nixon appointed [|Graham Martin] as U.S. ambassador to Vietnam. Martin was a second stringer compared to previous U.S. ambassadors and his appointment was an early signal that Washington had given up on Vietnam. During his confirmation hearings in June 1973, [|Secretary of Defense] [|James R. Schlesinger] stated that he would recommend resumption of U.S. bombing in North Vietnam if North Vietnam launched a major offensive against South Vietnam. On 4 June 1973, the U.S. Senate passed the [|Case-Church Amendment] to prohibit such intervention. [|[199]] 80.1–100% Republican || 80.1–100% Democratic || 60.1–80% Republican || 60.1–80% Democratic || up to 60% Republican || up to 60% Democratic || The oil price shock of October 1973 caused significant damage to the South Vietnamese economy. The Vietcong resumed offensive operations when dry season began and by January 1974 it had recaptured the territory it lost during the previous dry season. After two clashes that left 55 South Vietnamese soldiers dead, President Thiệu announced on 4 January that the war had restarted and that the Paris Peace Accord was no longer in effect. There had been over 25,000 South Vietnamese casualties during the ceasefire period. [|[200]] [|Gerald Ford] took over as U.S. president on 9 August 1974 after President Nixon resigned due to the [|Watergate scandal]. At this time, Congress cut financial aid to South Vietnam from $1 billion a year to $700 million. The U.S. midterm elections in 1974 brought in a new Congress dominated by Democrats who were even more determined to confront the president on the war. Congress immediately voted in restrictions on funding and military activities to be phased in through 1975 and to culminate in a total cutoff of funding in 1976. The success of the 1973–74 dry season offensive inspired Trà to return to Hanoi in October 1974 and plead for a larger offensive in the next dry season. This time, Trà could travel on a drivable highway with regular fueling stops, a vast change from the days when the Ho Chi Minh Trail was a dangerous mountain trek. [|[201]] Giáp, the North Vietnamese defense minister, was reluctant to approve Trà's plan. A larger offensive might provoke a U.S. reaction and interfere with the big push planned for 1976. Trà appealed over Giáp's head to first secretary [|Lê Duẩn], who approved of the operation. Trà's plan called for a limited offensive from Cambodia into [|Phuoc Long Province]. The strike was designed to solve local logistical problems, gauge the reaction of South Vietnamese forces, and determine whether U.S. would return to the fray. On 13 December 1974, North Vietnamese forces attacked Route 14 in Phuoc Long Province. Phuoc Binh, the provincial capital, fell on 6 January 1975. Ford desperately asked Congress for funds to assist and re-supply the South before it was overrun. Congress refused. The fall of Phuoc Binh and the lack of an American response left the South Vietnamese elite demoralized. The speed of this success led the Politburo to reassess its strategy. It was decided that operations in the Central Highlands would be turned over to General [|Văn Tiến Dũng] and that Pleiku should be seized, if possible. Before he left for the South, Dũng was addressed by Lê Duẩn: "Never have we had military and political conditions so perfect or a strategic advantage as great as we have now." [|[202]] At the start of 1975, the South Vietnamese had three times as much artillery and twice the number of tanks and armoured cars as the opposition. They also had 1,400 aircraft and a two-to-one numerical superiority in combat troops over their Communist enemies. [|[203]] However, the rising oil prices meant that much of this could not be used. They faced a well-organized, highly determined and well-funded North Vietnam. Much of the North's material and financial support came from the communist bloc. Within South Vietnam, there was increasing chaos. Their abandonment by the American military had compromised an economy dependent on U.S. financial support and the presence of a large number of U.S. troops. South Vietnam suffered from the global recession that followed the [|Arab oil embargo].
 * ~ In the 1972 Congressional Election, the majority of Americans voted for Democratic Congressmen. This map shows the House seats by party holding plurality in state ||

Campaign 275
On 10 March 1975, General Dung launched Campaign 275, a limited offensive into the Central Highlands, supported by tanks and heavy artillery. The target was [|Buôn Ma Thuột], in [|Đắk Lắk Province]. If the town could be taken, the provincial capital of [|Pleiku] and the road to the coast would be exposed for a planned campaign in 1976. The ARVN proved incapable of resisting the onslaught, and its forces collapsed on 11 March. Once again, Hanoi was surprised by the speed of their success. Dung now urged the Politburo to allow him to seize Pleiku immediately and then turn his attention to [|Kon Tum]. He argued that with two months of good weather remaining until the onset of the monsoon, it would be irresponsible to not take advantage of the situation. President [|Nguyễn Văn Thiệu], a former general, was fearful that his forces would be cut off in the north by the attacking communists; Thieu ordered a retreat. The president declared this to be a "lighten the top and keep the bottom" strategy. But in what appeared to be a repeat of [|Operation Lam Son 719], the withdrawal soon turned into a bloody rout. While the bulk of ARVN forces attempted to flee, isolated units fought desperately. ARVN General Phu abandoned Pleiku and Kon Tum and retreated toward the coast, in what became known as the "column of tears". As the ARVN tried to disengage from the enemy, refugees mixed in with the line of retreat. The poor condition of roads and bridges, damaged by years of conflict and neglect, slowed Phu's column. As the North Vietnamese forces approached, panic set in. Often abandoned by the officers, the soldiers and civilians were shelled incessantly. The retreat degenerated into a desperate scramble for the coast. By 1 April the "column of tears" was all but annihilated. On 20 March, Thieu reversed himself and ordered Huế, Vietnam's third-largest city, be held at all costs, and then changed his policy several times. Thieu's contradictory orders confused and demoralized his officer corps. As the North Vietnamese launched their attack, panic set in, and ARVN resistance withered. On 22 March, the VPA opened the siege of Huế. Civilians flooded the airport and the docks hoping for any mode of escape. Some even swam out to sea to reach boats and barges anchored offshore. In the confusion, routed ARVN soldiers fired on civilians to make way for their retreat. On 25 March, after a three-day battle, Huế fell. As resistance in Huế collapsed, North Vietnamese rockets rained down on [|Da Nang] and its airport. By 28 March 35,000 VPA troops were poised to attack the suburbs. By 30 March 100,000 leaderless ARVN troops surrendered as the VPA marched victoriously through Da Nang. With the fall of the city, the defense of the Central Highlands and Northern provinces came to an end.
 * = [[image:http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/9/99/Question_book-new.svg/50px-Question_book-new.svg.png width="50" height="39"]] || This section **needs additional [|citations] for [|verification] **. Please help [|improve this article] by adding citations to [|reliable sources] . Unsourced material may be [|challenged] and [|removed] . //(May 2008)// ||

Final North Vietnamese offensive
For more details on the final North Vietnamese offensive, see [|Ho Chi Minh Campaign]. With the northern half of the country under their control, the Politburo ordered General Dung to launch the final offensive against Saigon. The operational plan for the [|Ho Chi Minh Campaign] called for the capture of Saigon before 1 May. Hanoi wished to avoid the coming monsoon and prevent any redeployment of ARVN forces defending the capital. Northern forces, their morale boosted by their recent victories, rolled on, taking Nha Trang, Cam Ranh, and Da Lat. On 7 April, three North Vietnamese divisions attacked [|Xuan Loc], 40 miles (64 km) east of Saigon. The North Vietnamese met fierce resistance at Xuan Loc from the [|ARVN 18th Division], who were outnumbered six to one. For two bloody weeks, severe fighting raged as the ARVN defenders made a [|last stand] to try to block the North Vietnamese advance. By 21 April, however, the exhausted garrison were ordered to withdraw towards Saigon. An embittered and tearful President Thieu resigned on the same day, declaring that the United States had betrayed South Vietnam. In a scathing attack, he suggested U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had tricked him into signing the Paris peace agreement two years ago, promising military aid that failed to materialise. Having transferred power to [|Tran Van Huong], he left for [|Taiwan] on 25 April. At the same time, North Vietnamese tanks had reached [|Bien Hoa] and turned toward Saigon, brushing aside isolated ARVN units along the way. By the end of April, the ARVN had collapsed on all fronts except in the [|Mekong Delta]. Thousand of refugees streamed southward, ahead of the main communist onslaught. On 27 April 100,000 North Vietnamese troops encircled Saigon. The city was defended by about 30,000 ARVN troops. To hasten a collapse and foment panic, the VPA shelled the airport and forced its closure. With the air exit closed, large numbers of civilians found that they had no way out.

Fall of Saigon
Evacuation of [|CIA] station personnel by [|Air America] on 29 April 1975. Photo: [|Hubert van Es] / UPI Main articles: [|Fall of Saigon] and [|Operation Frequent Wind] Chaos, unrest, and panic broke out as hysterical South Vietnamese officials and civilians scrambled to leave Saigon. [|Martial law] was declared. American helicopters began evacuating South Vietnamese, U.S., and foreign nationals from various parts of the city and from the U.S. embassy compound. [|Operation Frequent Wind] had been delayed until the last possible moment, because of U.S. Ambassador [|Graham Martin] 's belief that Saigon could be held and that a political settlement could be reached. Schlesinger announced early in the morning of 29 April 1975 the evacuation from [|Saigon] by helicopter of the last U.S. diplomatic, military, and civilian personnel. Frequent Wind was arguably the largest helicopter evacuation in history. It began on 29 April, in an atmosphere of desperation, as hysterical crowds of Vietnamese vied for limited space. Martin pleaded with Washington to dispatch $700 million in emergency aid to bolster the regime and help it mobilize fresh military reserves. But American public opinion had soured on this conflict. In the United States, South Vietnam was perceived as doomed. President [|Gerald Ford] had given a televised speech on 23 April, declaring an end to the Vietnam War and all U.S. aid. Frequent Wind continued around the clock, as North Vietnamese tanks breached defenses on the outskirts of Saigon. In the early morning hours of 30 April, the last U.S. Marines evacuated the embassy by helicopter, as civilians swamped the perimeter and poured into the grounds. Many of them had been employed by the Americans and were left to their fate. Victorious NVA troops at the Presidential Palace, Saigon. On 30 April 1975, VPA troops overcame all resistance, quickly capturing key buildings and installations. A tank crashed through the gates of the [|Independence Palace], and at 11:30 am local time the NLF flag was raised above it. President [|Duong Van Minh], who had succeeded Huong two days earlier, surrendered. His surrender marked the end of 116 years of Vietnamese involvement in conflict either alongside or against various countries, primarily China, France, Japan and United States. [|[204]] 58,220 U.S. service members also died in the conflict. [|[A 2]]